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2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2018) (holding that the alleged misgendering, together with the opposite alleged offensive conduct, was sufficiently severe or pervasive to represent a violation of Title VII for functions of summary judgment); Tudor v. Se. 2 (N.D. Ala. Sept. Romeo Pimps’ or ‘loverboys’ are people who actively search for younger or otherwise vulnerable people male or female with intent to make them fall in love. 5-9 (concluding that an inexpensive jury could find that a male transgender corrections officer was subjected to a intercourse-based hostile work environment where, among other things, supervisors, coworkers, and inmates intentionally and repeatedly referred to him using feminine pronouns or referred to as him “ma’am”). Three (D. Ariz. July 8, 2019) (denying summary judgment to the employer on the plaintiff’s sex-based harassment claim the place the plaintiff, a corrections officer, presented evidence together with that “supervisors often disregarded his requests to conceal his status for the aim of protecting his security, and repeatedly engaged in conduct that may be thought of harassment by a jury”); Roberts v. Clark Cnty. Or. 2002) (denying summary judgment to the employer the place the alleged harassment included “questions reminiscent of, ‘Do you wear the dick in the relationship?’ and, ‘Are you the man?’”).
2002) (holding that the district courtroom erred in granting judgment as a matter of law for the employer the place sex-based harassment consisted of repeated touching, vulgar comments, propositions, and bodily aggression). 39 See, e.g., Roberts, 998 F. 3d at 121 (stating that alleged bodily assaults could also be part of a sample of objectionable, sex-based mostly discriminatory conduct that helps a hostile surroundings claim); Eller, 580 F. Supp. 2010) (stating that conduct that doesn’t have sexual connotations can contribute to a intercourse-based mostly hostile work setting). 3d at 129-30 (holding that the worker plausibly alleged sex-based harassment primarily based in part on being usually misgendered); Parker v. Strawser Constr., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2013) (explaining that non-sexual conduct might be based on intercourse and subsequently contribute to a intercourse-primarily based hostile work atmosphere); Rosario v. Dep’t of the Army, 607 F.3d 241, 248 (1st Cir. Title VII violation by displaying a hostile work setting primarily based on sexual orientation discrimination.” (citing Newbury v. City of Windcrest, 991 F.3d 672, 676-77 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that Title VII prohibits discharging an worker as a result of she is lactating).
2017) (concluding that Title VII prohibits discrimination primarily based on breastfeeding); EEOC v. Hous. 384 EEOC v. Glob. EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. 23 See EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. 28 See infra Example 35: Comparative Evidence Gives Rise to Inference that Harassment Is based on a Protected Characteristic (offering an instance of facially sex-impartial offensive conduct motivated by intercourse, similar to bullying directed toward workers of 1 intercourse). 2021) (stating that harassment on the basis of transgender identity is intercourse discrimination below Title VII because “it is not possible to discriminate in opposition to a person for being . 47 The ADEA does not apply to discrimination or harassment based on workers being younger than others, equivalent to harassment based on the assumption that somebody is too young for a sure position, even when the targeted individual is forty or over. Additional instances involving harassment based on gender identity include Copeland, 2024 WL 1316677; Eller v. Prince George’s Cnty. Md. 2022) (concluding that a reasonable jury might discover that the plaintiff was subjected to gender identification-based mostly harassment that was objectively severe or pervasive, including derogatory phrases referring to her transgender status); Brooks v. Temple Univ.
2011) (holding that a truth finder may conclude that the plaintiff, a used automobile salesperson, was subjected to a hostile work surroundings based on his age where the plaintiff’s supervisor had made profane, age-based references to the plaintiff up to half a dozen instances a day, the supervisor had engaged in bodily threatening behavior towards the plaintiff, and the supervisor had “steered” sales away from the plaintiff and towards younger salespersons). Courts-even previous to the Supreme Court’s Bostock resolution-have seen evidence of intentional misgendering of transgender persons as supportive of a hostile work environment claim underneath Title VII. 2007) (concluding that a declaration by a feminine worker that she was inspired by a supervisor to get an abortion was anecdotal evidence supporting a class declare of pregnancy discrimination). 2008) (holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination towards a feminine worker because she has had an abortion); Turic v. Holland Hosp., Inc., Eighty five F.3d 1211, 1214 (6th Cir. 6-10 (discovering that the company subjected a transgender worker to disparate therapy when it restricted her access to the women’s restroom on account of her gender identification).
